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I. INTRODUCTION

Financial crises around the globe place countries at risk. Not only do less
developed countries like Mexico and Argentina tremble from the inadequacies of
their banking systems, but large and developed economies such as Japan suffer
similar apprehension. As a result, national financial authorities find themselves
looking for a type of international financial entity that can coordinate the efforts
of these authorities in maintaining safety and soundness in their respective
financial and banking sectors. This being the case, financial markets need the
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assistance of an international institution that can regulate national banking
systems and, in return, can avoid any future financial crisis.
Many ideas regarding the form and mission of a new international financial
architecture already exist. Out of all the suggestions presented to the world
financial community, the most appealing is creating a new "World Financial
Authority." However, attempts to develop a World Financial Authority proved
unsuccessful, and this goal remains unfeasible. Because the world is composed of
scores of independent regulatory regimes, it is unrealistic to expect nations to
unite behind a singular government or multinational entity. Therefore, this article
addresses one of the most difficult questions facing the Twenty-First Century:
what is the degree of regulation that should be imposed upon a free enterprise
society that will yield the benefits of economic freedom and control?
It will be argued that unlike creating a new organization, for which
conditions seem unripe at the present or near future, the transformation of current
international financial and banking institutions into a World Financial Authority
presents a realistic opportunity. The authors believe that the Bank for
International Settlements ("BIS") is the proper institution to further consolidate
international financial stability.
II. THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS ("BIS")
A. Creation and Overview of the BIS
During the 1930s, the BIS, gradually, and even by default or destiny, found
its position in the international banking world as a crisis manager. In particular,
Member States of the Convention of the Hague wanted to establish a financial
organization, not necessarily a "real" bank, that would tackle the burden of
arranging the reparation payments owed by Germany to various countries. In
1929, the BIS was founded in Basel, Switzerland, and, in response to the
Convention's Member States' desire, the organization positioned itself as an
advisor in the bank regulatory process by providing a place for central banks to
meet and deliberate.
In addition, the BIS undertook the role of acting as a trustee for international
loans issued to finance Germany's reparations costs. Since the BIS officials
considered managing this national financial crisis as achieving safety and
soundness in the international banking and financial system, they encouraged the
central banks to unite and manage the international financial crises of the 1930s,
specifically through using current loan and debt defaults. When the problems
surrounding German reparations were resolved by BIS officials, it was
commonly believed that the BIS had fulfilled its functions and would be
dissolved. This action seemed appropriate when the Bretton Woods Conference
created the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). Located in Washington D.C.,
it was assumed the IMF would have primary jurisdiction over managing the
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world's future financial problems. As a result, the final declaration of the Bretton
Woods Conference liquidated the BIS.
However, this liquidation never occurred. On the contrary, surrounded by
mysticism and sheer luck, the BIS gradually became the center of the world
banking system (the "central bank" of the central banks), the primary keeper of
records, the situs for international banker meetings, and the source for regular
reports on the financial condition of the world's governments and banks. As a
result, the BIS became vital in deciding the ongoing issue of whether all national
central banks, which were regularly accepted as the monitor of their own
domestic money supply, should also have a bank regulatory function. The United
States answered this question affirmatively by creating the Federal Reserve
System to regulate many U.S. banks, particularly the largest banks. In contrast,
England stripped its government's authority to regulate English commercial
banks through the creation of the Financial Service Authority in 1997.
B. OriginalMembers of the BIS
The original central bank members were the then major industrialized
countries: France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
Although the international banking community desperately desired to include the
United States, the new U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve Board ("Federal
Reserve"), declined the invitation to this "central banker's club." Initially, the
U.S. Congress had an unfounded fear and hesitation in allowing the Federal
Reserve to play an integral part of the BIS forum. Most likely, Congress was not
ready to release the authority and power it had to regulate both the domestic and
international financial markets over to the BIS, the world's most powerful and
influential bank regulatory agency. Nevertheless, in 1994, the Federal Reserve
decided to join the BIS. Interestingly enough, the Federal Reserve's timing in
joining the BIS corresponded with the European member countries establishing
their own "central bank" named the European Central Bank. Perhaps the United
States believed it was time to fill the empty shoes left by the founding European
central bank members (U.K., Germany, France, Italy, etc).
C. OrganizationalStructure of the BIS
The BIS's organizational structure consists primarily of three bodies: the
General Meeting, Board, and Management of the bank. The General Meeting is
comprised of the BIS central bank members. The principal duties of the General
Meeting include: approving the annual financial documentation of the BIS,
appointing members to the Board, and amending the by-laws. The Board, headed
by a Chairman, consists of governors of the BIS central bank members. The
Board has authority to act on behalf of the BIS with third parties in various
banking and financial transactions. A President, Vice President, a General
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Manager, and various department heads run the daily business activity of the BIS
Management.
Shares owned by central banks around the world represent almost eighty
percent of the BIS's capital. Shares owned by private investors who are mainly
major international financial institutions represent approximately fourteen
percent. However, of the shareholders, only central bank members have the right
to participate in the BIS organizational structure, such as General Meeting, Board
and Management.
Estimates of BIS assets have totaled at over $180 billion in U.S. dollars, and
its capital and reserves at approximately $10 billion in U.S dollars. Due to its
unique position among central banks, the BIS holds substantial reserves in
foreign exchange currency, which are heavily deposited with the BIS by central
banks. Central banks comfortably store their money with the BIS and allow the
organization to invest these assets.
D. Role of the BIS
In order to ensure safety, soundness, and a safety net for the international
banking system, the BIS works closely with international banks, financial
institutions, and other entities. For example, in 1999, through the initiative of the
BIS, the international banking community formed the Financial Stability Forum.
The Forum has significantly improved national financial authority surveillance
and supervision. In addition, the BIS forms standing committees such as the
Committee on Banking Supervision ("CBS"), Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, and Committee on Global Financial System to coordinate
the BIS efforts and energies in improving the international financial system.
Furthermore, the BIS coordinates with the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund to provide international financial supervision. BIS's coordination
often overlaps with these allied international institutions in extinguishing fires
quickly in risky financial markets.
Among its other activities, the BIS holds and trades central banks' gold, buys
and sells various securities (principally short-term), and tenders loans to central
banks. The loans are usually guaranteed by governments or backed with gold
deposited at the bank. The BIS's careful approach to lending, topped with
extensive research into the international financial markets, usually enables the
BIS to avoid entering into troubled loans. In addition, the BIS is heavily involved
in foreign exchange currency trading.
One of the BIS's best-kept secrets is its ability to conduct business for its
own interest, as well as the interests of central banks. The BIS takes advantage of
the fact that central banks conduct their financial affairs independent from their
governments. Furthermore, the BIS retains autonomy through various international
conventions and treaties. Therefore, by trading on the independence of the central
banks and its own independence, the BIS is able to enter into financial transactions
which remain unaccounted for in the public records. Due to close relationships
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with central banks and other financial institutions around the world, the BIS is able
to give particularly close attention to the money it manages. Overall, the BIS is
granted high scores in its management of the central banks' money.
Despite the BIS's vast successes during the almost seventy-five years since
its creation, it has been criticized for some of its activities. For example, the BIS
has yet to clear allegations that it collaborated with the Nazis in laundering the
gold stolen by the Germans in the Second World War. However, it remains the
duty of historians to reveal the truth about these allegations.
E. The Committee on Banking Supervision ("CBS")
In 1974, three major international banks collapsed: the Herstatt Bank in West
Germany, the British-Israel Bank of London, and the Franklin National Bank in the
United States. In addition to a generally deteriorating international banking climate,
these failures caused the leading central bankers to desire some form of effective
global bank control. As a result, the Committee on Banking Supervision was
established at the BIS headquarters in Basel. The CBS creation, a cooperative
effort of the Group of Ten countries (the "Group") and Switzerland, sparked
subsequent committee groups to effectively improve many aspects of banking
operations.
From its inception, the CBS's international influence has grown steadily.
Originally a creation of the Group, the CBS expanded its influence to countries
and large banking organizations outside the Group. As a result, it has become the
leading international influence for cooperation among countries, regulators, and
banks, and has undoubtedly been a prime reason for keeping the banking system
generally stable. Bank failures that occurred since CBS's founding strengthened
world opinion that an international governing body is necessary, and, therefore,
have added to the force and effectiveness of the CBS.
A growing number of separate committees have expanded on the work of the
CBS. For example, in 1990, the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes was
established by the CBS to study electronic payment systems among banks and how
these systems may be supervised internationally for the safety of the banks and for
those that use their services. The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates was
established in 1996 by the CBS and two other international financial service
committees: the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors. Large international banking
organizations formed as holding companies bring together traditional banking,
securities activities, and insurance. This combination received a major boost in 1999
with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the United States. This
empowered banks and their holding company affiliates to enter into the securities and
insurance businesses. As a result, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act stimulated a rapid
growth in mergers combining the field of traditional banking, securities activities,
and insurance. The three international committees dealing with these fields joined
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forces separately to regulate the new international offerings of banking, securities,
and insurance.
F. BIS Rules, Recommendations, and Publications
The BIS issues various publications concerning improving bank activities
and consolidating financial markets. However, the rules, recommendations, and
any related publications produced by the BIS are not binding upon banks and
national financial authorities. Even central bank members of the BIS, as well as
banks and other financial institutions under their supervision, are not required to
adopt the BIS's recommendations. These non-mandatory rules are often called
"soft-law" because they lack legal force and compliance requirements.
Nevertheless, due to the BIS's long-standing tradition of prudence and
strictly approaching the international banking system, the BIS is greatly
respected amongst the national financial authorities and banks under their
supervision. Therefore, regardless of the fact that the BIS's recommendations and
rules are "soft-law," national financial authorities increasingly view adopting
these recommendations as a necessity for conducting their activities.
The most significant of the CBS's documents, in terms of its long range effect
upon the international banking system, is the Basel Concordat ("Concordat")
issued in 1975. The Concordat deals principally with banks that expand across
borders. Specifically, the Concordat establishes the relationship between the
home state, where the bank is organized, and the host state(s), where the bank
conducts business outside its home state.
The Concordat decrees that the home state shall be primarily responsible for
the financial health, safety, and soundness of the institution and the host state
bears responsibility for the powers and functions of the bank. As a result, the
principles of the Concordat have been translated into banking laws of numerous
countries, including the laws of the United States. Where adopted, the Concordat
assures that an international bank is subjected to home state supervision.
In addition, the financial crises of the 1930s and 1970s stimulated the BIS to
increase its efforts to provide financial stability to the global financial markets. In
particular, following the financial crises of the 1970s, the United States and the
United Kingdom entered into a joint initiative regarding risk management
systems between the respective countries. As a result, in 1988, the BIS via the
CBS, issued a "soft-law" titled "Basel Capital Adequacy Accord" ("Basel
Accord").
Of the reports issued by the BIS, the Basel Accord receive the most global
attention. In essence, the Basel Accord is a globally agreed upon standard under
which national financial authorities calculate and set capital charges for all
internationally active banks. The Accord principally addresses commercial
banking with a focus on bank credit and market risk. Initially, under the Basel
Accord, banks were required to hold capital equal to eight percent of the risk
weighted value of assets. However, in 1996, the Basel Accord was amended to

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 18

permit banks and other financial institutions to use internal models to calculate
their market risk capital charges.
Furthermore, in the summer of 2004, the CBS revised the Basel Accord by
issuing recommendations for a new capital adequacy framework commonly
known as Basel II. Basel II offers a new set of standards for establishing
minimum capital requirements for banks and other financial institutions. Basel II
is aimed at promoting the adequate capitalization of banks, as well as
encouraging banks to improve risk management in the course of their activities.
This is based on three "pillar" initiatives: "Pillar 1" revises the minimum capital
requirements under the 1988 Basel Accord to align more closely to specific
bank's actual risk of loss; "Pillar 2" provides for the efficient supervision of
financial institutions' internal assessments of their risks, ensuring 'that
management exercises sound judgment and provides adequate capital; and "Pillar
3" provides for market discipline by requiring adequate and revealing public
disclosure.
Basel II is also responsible for a doctrine many consider counter-intuitive: "a
bank's capital should not be established by regulatory fiat; rather, it should be
created by the bank's own evaluation of its financial structure." The heart of
Basel II is that the government regulators evaluate a bank's management
structure. The drafters of Basel II believed that a bank's own sense of its
solvency and risk should determine its capital, which requires a well-run bank by
competent managers. The CBS recommends that national financial authorities
implement Basel II by no later than 2007. The United States has delayed
implementation of Basel II to 2012. However, the general belief is that Basel II's
sophistication makes it appropriate for only the largest banks. Furthermore, when
it becomes local regulation, Basel I will only be adopted by approximately
fifteen banks.
The Accord has, with appropriate local amendments, been adopted as the
capital standard of most sophisticated banking economies. This is, of course, the
direct result of the people who worked in the CBS and the stature it has achieved
with the local bank regulators and legislatures. Considering that it has no legal
binding force, the success of the Accord is remarkable.
In addition, the CBS has issued other papers, including papers on risk
management and electronic banking, the latter of which was published in 2003.
In general, the papers were accepted in concept by the local banking regulators
and imposed an increased consistency to international banking.
G. Implementation of BIS Rules, Recommendations and Publications
The significance and importance of BIS recommendations in the national
banking systems around the world is illustrated by the 100 to 120 countries that
have already implemented the 1988 Basel Accord. For example, from 1988 to
1996, almost ninety-two percent of banks and other financial institutions
increased their capital requirements. In addition, seventy-six percent of banks
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raised their risk-weighted assets base. Furthermore, between 1988 and 1996,
banks increased their risk based capital ratios from approximately 9.3 percent up
to 11.2 percent.
In 1990, the United States implemented the 1988 Basel Accord in accordance
with the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983. Since its implementation,
the U.S. banking authorities--consisting of the Federal Reserve, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationhave worked closely to implement the Basel Accord's recommendations
harmoniously amongst U.S. banks and other financial institutions. Nevertheless,
the U.S. regulatory officials, notably U.S. Comptroller Hawke, as well as leading
scholars in the banking industry, for example, Carter Golembe, have voiced
recent dissent against the 1988 Basel Accord. Specifically, they believe the
minimum capital adequacy requirements are heavy handed, verbose, and often
appear confusing. A corresponding tendency is to permit local markets and banks
to regulate such matters as capital structure, capital adequacy, credit risk
modeling, and asset liquidity.
Nevertheless, similar to the U.S. banking regulatory institutions, European
Union authorities have generally implemented the essence of the Basel Accord.
The European Union passed various directives in compliance with the Basel
Accord including: the EU Directive on Investment Services; the EU Directive on
Capital Adequacy; the EU Directive on Solvency Ratio; the EU Directive on
Own Funds; and the EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee Scheme. Upon passage
of these Union-wide directives, each European member country adopted them
into its national law.
Among the world's industrialized countries, Japan's adoption of the Basel
Accord derived the most positive results. Nevertheless, the Accords are not a
panacea for financial problems. The Japanese banking system must continue its
restructuring process in order to liberalize the banking sector and relieve the
pressure of current problems, particularly those resulting from foreign capital
investments.
China also shows signs that it will implement the Basel Accord's
recommendations. Specifically, it will implement the recommendations relating
to asset quality evaluation procedures, adequacy of loan loss reserves standards,
and the adoption of bank internal rating systems. However, due to China's
financial market structure, which is subject to heavy government regulation,
particularly with regard to utilizing foreign capital, the effects of the Basel
Accord's rules in China is unknown.
Furthermore, many non-BIS member national financial authorities (and
banks under these authorities), mostly from developing countries, voluntarily
embraced the Basel Accord's rules and the BIS's recommendations. Such
authorities realized they cannot exist isolated from the international banking
community. Because less developed countries' banking systems are particularly
susceptible to banking crises, they provide a test tube for evaluating the Basel
Accord's success and development.
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BIS recommendation's are headed for global adoption. The BIS
recommendations have a tendency for adoption by national financial authorities
within particular regions. Regional authorities increasingly rely upon one another
in absorbing the BIS proposals into regulatory regimes. In addition, major
international banks with large exposure in multiple regions assist local authorities
to understand and implement the financial ideas promulgated by the BIS.
Therefore, it is expected that the BIS will have growing importance in the
regulation of the international banking system. For example, as the banking
system globalizes and, therefore, becomes more reliant upon advanced
technology, and as local banking systems increasingly integrate, BIS advice and
supervision become more significant.
III. LACK OF AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION
The BIS and its related committees offer international banking regulation to
an industry that is generally subjected to high levels of local supervision, but
essentially no regulation from abroad. While each bank is probably regulated to
some degree in both its home country and in the host countries where it conducts
business, the international aspect of the industry indicates that there are areas
where regulation may be nonexistent or, even when it exists, insufficient.
For example, the massive and expensive failure of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International ("BCCI") indicates that a home country like
Luxembourg may lack the power necessary to control a massive international
bank. BCCI, financed with Arab oil money, selected Luxembourg (one suspects)
precisely because of its inability to impose real regulation. The BIS undoubtedly
has the power, which is derived from its Member States, to supply meaningful
international regulation to a host country-bank scenario like Luxembourg-BCCI.
However, what the BIS lacks is international legitimacy; more specifically, it
lacks the force of binding law.
A. InternationalFinancialOrganization
Most of the world has adopted the free market system as the model for
economic progress. With the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries that continue to adhere to
Communism as an economic ideal. In other newly-formed countries (most
notably post-communist Russia) where free enterprise is adopted as a model,
communism is quickly perceived as only the beginning of an effective system.
The question which remains (one of the most difficult facing the twenty-first
century) is: what degree of regulation should be imposed upon a free enterprise
society that will yield the benefits of economic freedom and control?
In the United States and Great Britain, citizens have an appropriate mix of
freedom and control. Therefore, the United States expects other countries to
adopt versions of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S.
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Federal Trade Commission, and various U.S. banking regulators. With regard to
banking, it is generally accepted that regulation is essential to a well-functioning
system. For example, benefits such as "deposit insurance" make some form of
underlying regulation a virtual necessity. Such underlying regulation is illustrated
by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). The FDIC is more
than an insurance agency. It is a regulator that constantly reviews the banking
system to see that its assets are not at undue risk. However, the FDIC's functions
must be monitored to increase its efficiency and its solvency.
B. Scope of An InternationalFinancialOrganization
National financial authorities desire a type of international financial entity
that has the legal authority to maintain safety and soundness in world financial
banking sectors. Because no attempt to accomplish this goal has succeeded, an
alternative is creating an international financial organization, which would serve
as a formal world regulator and, perhaps also, a lender of last resort. The IMF,
and in particular central banks and the BIS, have served such a function.
However, they have failed to manage and administer properly economic and
financial reforms, while at the same time lending monies to countries in need.
Descriptions of an ideal world financial regulator often seem to be describing
the BIS and its affiliated committees. The proposed duties of an international
financial organization would ideally include: researching markets and economic
policies; regulating the flow of capital movement in international financial
markets; preventing currency crises and undue speculations in foreign currency
exchange trading; managing risk when domestic macroeconomic policies are
implemented; closely observing national financial market deregulation; and
taking responsibility for handling economic issues outside the scope of national
governments and their national financial authorities.
C. Proposalfor An InternationalFinancialOrganization
Normally, discussions regarding the solution to a problem occur only after
the problem has arisen. This is exactly what happened during the financial crisis
of the 1990s, particularly with the Asian crisis of 1997. The most industrialized
countries of the West, which were concerned about the Asian financial crisis
rapidly spreading into Western markets, debated the need to reform international
financial architecture. As a result, various distinguished international banking
field bankers and scholars proposed ideas concerning changing the form and
mission of international financial architecture. The most relevant approaches,
among many, filtered down to three.
The first proposal was that the international financial community should let
market forces decide on the method and timing necessary to intervene into a
financial crisis. Although most economists generally support free market
autonomy, there was little sincere acceptance of the first proposal.
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The second proposal to avoiding international financial crises by making
fundamental changes was supported by leading economic scholars John Eatwell
and Lance Taylor. They encouraged creating a super-regulator (or as they called
it, a "World Financial Authority"). According to Eatwell and Taylor, the World
Financial Authority would be an independent international financial institution in
charge of maintaining order in the international financial and banking system.
This proposal appeared closest to meeting the real needs for reform of the
international financial architecture.
The third proposal, known as the "step by step initiative," consisted of
dealing with specific crises as they occur. Recently, this concept of dealing with
''one crisis at a time" seems to be the idea endorsed by most in the international
banking field. For example, when particular crises in Russia, Brazil, Argentina,
and Asia occurred, the international banking community tackled each
individually. As a result, different financial package aids were provided for
different crises.
Furthermore, central bankers and financial ministers of the most industrialized
economies formed the Financial Stability Forum (the "Forum") as a cornerstone
for building the international financial architecture. The Forum was expected to
become a quasi-World Financial Authority. However, it felt short of creating a
permanent and independent financial institution. It became evident that
something more was necessary to establish a large and permanent role in
regulating the international banking system and to achieve recognition from the
national financial authorities worldwide.
In addition, there were suggestions to grant the IMF broader power and
authority, so it could properly supervise and manage the international financial
market. This suggestion as well as others (for example, merging of the IMF with
the World Bank) calling for a "New Bretton Woods" initiative, etc., remained
simply ideas on paper.
1. Disagreements Relating to a New World FinancialAuthority
Out of all the approaches and suggestions presented to the world financial
community after the Asian crisis of 1997, the most appealing was Eatwell's and
Taylor's proposal to create a new World Financial Authority. The new World
Financial Authority would assist the existing national financial authorities in
issuing and implementing a library of new rules and regulations. Since the barrier
between international and domestic markets has become almost imperceptible,
simultaneous changes in national financial structures seemed appropriate to
reflect changes in the international architecture.
There have been considerations in the past of a World Financial Authority. It
seems that the concept, though good, may be impracticable. The world is
composed of scores of independent regulatory regimes that are likely to remain
autonomous. Nevertheless, proposals have been made to transform current
international financial and banking institutions into a World Financial Authority.

2005 /A Speculation on the Future of the Bankfor InternationalSettlements
Some institutions have been rejected as prospects. The IMF, the World Bank,
and many other smaller international institutions, were all seen as too entrenched
in their present tasks and too specialized to carry out the role of a World
Financial Authority. Out of the existing international financial organizations, the
BIS has been increasingly recognized as the model for a World Financial
Authority. However, it has also been suggested that rather than transforming the
BIS into a World Financial Authority, the BIS should continue carrying on its
current course. Whether this evolved through coincidence or a well-conceived
strategy is not particularly relevant. In all actuality, since its creation in 1929, the
BIS has achieved the role of a quasi-soft law World Financial Authority. Due to
its reputation and prestige among the international financial community, national
financial authorities take notice when the BIS recommends implementation of its
directives. The clear example was the implementation of the Basel Accords from
more than 120 national financial authorities around the world.
It is unknown how much closer the BIS will get to a World Financial
Authority. It is, however, indisputable that reality is not ready for a truly established
World Financial Authority because governments are not yet ready to give up their
national supervision and regulatory powers. However, by voluntarily implementing
BIS recommendations, governments have, in essence, transferred at least some
authority to the BIS. National authorities cannot afford to ignore the BIS
recommendations because doing so might result in isolating their markets.
U.S. regulators and banks are opposed to creating a World Financial
Authority. They believe that due to the strong and influential financial position of
the United States in the world economy, the United States is able to carry out a
de facto role as leader. In particular, the U.S. Congress points to the results and
bureaucratic functioning of the World Bank and IMF as negative examples. In
fact, many members of Congress view the two organizations as irrelevant
institutions that create more problems than they solve in the international
financial markets. Furthermore, one suspects that a World Financial Authority
would lose touch with reality because of its overwhelming scope of authority. In
particular, the World Financial Authority, as a lender of last-resort, would require
large sources of liquidity that, at best estimate, would be virtually inconceivable
to create and maintain.
2. The BIS as the ProperInstitution to FurtherConsolidate International
FinancialStability
The authors believe that the BIS is the proper institution to further
consolidate international financial stability. The rapid change in the financial
markets today further complicates creating a new regulatory institution. The
volatility makes it difficult to establish an entirely new model. Therefore, for the
time being, it would be safest and most practical to transform an existing
financial institution. In the meantime, international financial institutions must
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remain alert and increase their own surveillance in maintaining the safety and
soundness of the international financial and banking systems.
The idea that the BIS or its affiliated institutions led by the CBS might
become a true international bank regulator contains the basic ideal that a unified
international banking law will exist. If accomplished, there would be a bank
operation consistency absent in today's far flung and unorganized financial
maelstrom. This proposal must deal with two basic problems.
The first is the inescapable fact that a multitude of different banking regimes
exist globally. Therefore, to reduce them to one regime has the flavor of putting
Humpty Dumpty back together. Can a model meld a single banking system
(which most nations utilize) with the dual-banking approach of the United States
(the world superpower)? Nevertheless, at the United Nations, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") division has frequently
addressed difficult and apparently insoluble problems stemming from conflicting
international approaches. UNCITRAL provides hope that no problem is too
difficult to be resolved.
Assuming that a single set of regulations acceptable to the family of banking
countries is discovered, there may be a deeper problem: abdicating sovereignty.
Accepting any international body's directions over domestic law is often a bitter
pill for any country accustomed to its own sovereignty to swallow. On the one
hand, the United Nation's Security Council has achieved such authority through
the veto given and retained by the dominant international countries. On the other
hand, no judicial body has been able to defeat local bias by domestic courts that
simply do not want to lose judicial independence.
Whether countries, their citizens, and their legislative bodies will ever
voluntarily accord ultimate control over their banking systems to some form of
supra-national body remains to be seen. It certainly is questionable, especially
because the United States is reluctant to accord ultimate control over its banking
systems to some form of supra-national body. Realistically, there is no likelihood
of success of a bill or regulation that proposes the Federal Reserve Board, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC cede authority to some higher
authority located in Basel, Switzerland. If a single international banking authority
is a desirable ideal, it is only achievable another way.
IV. CONCLUSION

For those favoring the supra-national authority, there is cause for optimism.
The CBS has gradually taken some supra-national banking control by force of its
own stellar performance. Regulations without any legal force have been adopted
around the world because they are excellent and important. To refuse a proposal
solely because it derives from a foreign institution is faulty vanity. However, the
fault is compounded if the institution includes one's own countrymen.
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Rules and recommendations released by the BIS (mainly by the CBS) are
now actually called "soft law" because, while they do not have the binding
quality of actual law, they do often show the way and are likely to morph into
"hard" local rules. As these proposed rules and recommendation receive
acceptance in local countries, the prestige of the BIS and its affiliated institutions
expand. One can start to imagine the BIS in place as a real regulator. While this
situation is still some years ahead, it does not seem impossible or even unlikely.

